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paid the costs of the 
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James TATE 
Abstract 
Insured losses in the Canterbury earthquakes have been estimated at over 
$23bn.  The size of these losses pushed the NZ insurance industry and its 
members to their limits following the quakes, though the losses will 
ultimately be borne by NZ policy holders in the long term.  Insurance 
industry reform was underway before the quakes but they provided a strong 
motivator for regulatory change to add further stability.  NZ has depleted the 
EQC earthquake fund and must therefore rely on a strengthened insurance 
industry to guard against natural disasters in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
When Canterbury experienced a 7.1 magnitude earthquake on September 4th 
2010 the New Zealand insurance industry faced the single most expensive 
event it had ever experienced.  Less than six months later this record was 
surpassed again, with a devastating 6.3 magnitude quake on February 22nd 
2011.  The economic loss from these quakes, and subsequent aftershocks, has 
been estimated at $30bn - over 15% of New Zealand’s annual GDP.   
 
This essay explores how the earthquakes and subsequent losses have shaped 
the NZ insurance industry.  I explore who is liable for the substantial 
financial costs of the quake, and how the liable parties have motivated 
changes within the insurance industry.  I unravel the complex 
interdependencies between some of the industries key players, isolating each 
of their roles in the aftermath of the quakes.    
 
The essay proceeds as follows: Section 2 looks at the state of the NZ 
insurance market before the Canterbury earthquakes.  Section 3 of the essay 
details the immediate cost of the quakes.  Section 4 examines the role of four 
groups in paying for the quake losses:  NZ insurance companies, EQC, 
international reinsurers and NZ policy holders.  Section 5 looks at the 
regulatory change in the NZ insurance market coinciding with the 
earthquakes.  Section 6 then explores how the insurance market looks today.   
2 The NZ Insurance Industry Preceding 
the Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
Prior to the Canterbury earthquakes the New Zealand insurance market could 
be summarised as very competitive, with premiums driven relatively low and 
firms relying on product differentiation to entice customers.  The five largest 
non-life insurance companies were Insurance Australia Group (IAG), Vero 
Insurance New Zealand, Lumley General Insurance, AMI Insurance and 
Tower Insurance (Reactions, 2011).  All of these firms, with the exception of 
AMI, had large parent companies in Australia. 
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As is standard practice in the insurance industry, retail insurers were reliant 
on international reinsurance firms to take major risks off NZ books.  
Essentially this is a contract that provides local insurance firms with 
protection against large scale events.  McKenzie (2011) suggests that, when 
viewed from a reinsurer’s perspective, reinsurance is less of an insurance 
product and more of an international investment product.  As such, when the 
international firms consider NZ reinsurance products they weigh the risk of 
disaster against the size of the premiums, just as risk is weighed against 
expected returns for all financial investment decisions. 
 
Since NZ firms had a relatively low rate of claims compared to international 
firms, including our close neighbours Australia, NZ reinsurance products 
were generally considered low risk investments.  As a result the premiums 
charged for the reinsurance cover were relatively low. Given the historically 
small impact New Zealand accounts had on the books of large Australian 
companies, many of those firms with parents in Australia reportedly 
leveraged their reinsurance based off their parent company- paying little 
attention to the underlying fundamentals of NZ policies (McKenzie, 2011). 
 
New Zealand also has a Government run Earthquake Commission (EQC), 
which acts as a financial back-up for insured residential New Zealanders in 
the event of a natural disaster.  For any retail insurance policy, a small 
portion of the premiums are forwarded on to EQC in return for natural 
disaster insurance cover.  This premium was 5 cents for every $100 of 
insurance cover, up to a maximum of $69 annually (English, October 2011)  
The maximum cover provided to the policy holder in a disaster is $100,000 
for homes and $20,000 for contents, with any shortfall being borne by the 
retail provider of the insurance policy (EQC, 2011). 
 
The rare nature of natural disasters allowed EQC to build up a substantial 
“nest-egg” of $6bn in their Natural Disaster Fund as a result of collecting of 
premiums without facing any large pay-outs.  On top of this, their funds are 
reinsured by international organisations for any event claims above $1.5bn, 
up to a maximum of $4bn, and they are guaranteed by the NZ Government 
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should they face a situation where their obligations exceed their access to 
capital.   
 
New Zealand historically maintained one the most unregulated insurance 
industries of all our trading partners.  Following a Government review of the 
Regulation of Non-Bank Financial Products and Providers in 2005, 
development of a regulatory structure for the industry began (Dean, 2010).  
Commentators agreed that a degree of regulation and monitoring would 
ensure improved stability in an increasingly important market.  The Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was the obvious choice as the market ‘watch 
dog’ due to their experience in regulating and supervising banking activities.  
 
Though the proposal for insurance market supervision was issued as early as 
2005, there is no doubt the global financial crisis encouraged its timely 
development.  When the world witnessed how the potential collapse of 
insurer AIG threatened to throw the entire US economy into a deep recession, 
the importance of insurance companies in the global economy became 
apparent.  New Zealand shared the concerns of many nations around the 
world, in reference to a loosely regulated industry having such significant 
influence over the national economy.  It was in this setting that the Insurance 
(Prudential Supervision) Act 2010 was drafted, in a bid to add transparency 
and stability in the insurance market, and hence the NZ economy as a whole. 
3 The Cost of the Quakes 
 
In the early hours of the 4th of September 2010, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake 
hit 40km west of Christchurch.  There was widespread damage to 
infrastructure, as well as residential properties and some historic buildings. 
Despite two people suffering serious injuries, there were no deaths directly 
attributed to the earthquake- a fact credited to the early hour at which the 
quake struck.  
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Following the quake, the citizens of Christchurch remained very aware of the 
earthquake risks, and were frequently reminded of these risks by on-going 
aftershocks.  This provided some motivation toward part of the central city, 
and some particularly unstable buildings, being cordoned off to prevent 
public access (CCC, 2010).  These actions added substantially to the on-
going costs of the quake due to the disruption caused to local businesses.  
 
The total financial cost of the quake was substantial for the relatively small 
economy of New Zealand.  Building owners faced expensive rebuilds, 
businesses lost substantial revenues and the repairs required to infrastructure 
were extensive.  For those who were insured, the costs were passed on to the 
insurance companies, and the estimated insured loss was approximately $6bn 
according to major reinsurer Swiss Re (The Nelson Mail, 2012).  This made 
the September Earthquake in Christchurch the world’s second largest natural 
disaster in 2010 in terms of the insured value of the losses (Swiss Re, 2011).   
The cost of the 2010 Earthquake was dwarfed when the 6.3 magnitude quake 
hit in February 2011.  Despite the magnitude of the quake being significantly 
smaller then in September, it was centred at a depth of only 5km, leading to 
substantial damage to Christchurch city and the surrounding areas.  Also, the 
timing of the quake in the middle of the day meant the losses were 
substantially higher, in terms of both property and human life.    
 
Already crippled infrastructure sustained further damage. Entire suburbs 
were without water or power, and roads were cracked and covered with 
liquefaction.  Many buildings in central Christchurch were damaged beyond 
repair and their instability resulted in large parts of the CBD being cordoned 
off. Business in Christchurch was essentially closed down for months.  The 
quake also had a more significant affect on residential properties than the 
2010 quake.  An estimated 100,000 homes suffered quake damage, including 
some 10,000 that required complete demolition (Tait, 2011)       
 
Swiss Re estimates the insured loss of the February quake to be $14.5bn 
dollars (2011).   This represents only 80% of economic losses, which were 
estimated at $18bn.  These figures place the quake as the third most 
expensive in history in terms of insured losses, due to a combination of the 
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extensive damage and the high level of insurance holdings by New 
Zealanders.  
 
Aftershocks of varying strengths have continued to plague the city since the 
major quakes, some creating further damage to the regions crippled 
infrastructure. Among these aftershocks, a 6.4 magnitude quake on June 13th 
created further damage to the city.  The marginal insured loss was $2.5bn, 
and the economic loss was $3.5bn.  This brings the total insured loss for the 
Canterbury earthquakes to $23bn, and the economic loss to almost $30bn.  
The liability for these losses is spread across several parties.   
4 Paying the Cost of the Quakes 
4.1 Insurance Companies 
 
Given the large number of parties affected by the Canterbury earthquakes, 
insurance companies were immediately swamped with claims.  Beyond the 
obvious logistical difficulties that arise from such an influx of claims, there 
were more serious concerns about the ability of insurance companies to meet 
their financial obligations.   
 
As discussed earlier, EQC provides limited support to residential policy 
holders in the event of a natural disaster.  While the insurance companies 
received some pay-outs from EQC, the amount they were able to receive was 
capped at $100,000 for each policy, and an estimated 30,000 houses 
sustained damage beyond this level (Reactions, August 2011).  The shortfall 
between the claim and EQC pay-out represents the liability of the insurance 
company. 
 
Reinsurance was essential for the companies to meet their net residential 
obligations, as well as their commercial obligations which were not covered 
by EQC.  The reinsurance pay-out they received was obviously dependent on 
the level of cover they had obtained prior to the quakes.  Given that no 
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insurer was fully covered, all of the major insurance companies in NZ 
incurred significant losses.  The companies with a deep pocketed parent 
company in Australia were at a definite advantage and were able to absorb 
the substantial losses presented by the earthquakes. 
AMI Insurance was the exception, with the combination of their insufficient 
reinsurance cover and the lack of an international parent leading to their 
inability to absorb the losses driven by their Canterbury clients.  AMI faced 
an estimated $1.8bn in Christchurch earthquake claims, but only had $1.3bn 
in reinsurance, leaving a $500m shortfall (Steeman, 2011).  The shortfall 
represented a serious risk to the stability of the New Zealand market, and the 
85,000 Cantabrians who held policies with them (English, April 2011). When 
their precarious financial position became apparent after the February quake, 
they began to work with the Government toward a solution. 
On April 7th, the Government announced they would provide AMI with 
financial support should it be requested.  The deal came in the form of $500m 
of convertible preference shares which the Crown could purchase at any 
stage in return for full control of the company.  Further, if the losses extended 
below this point the Crown guaranteed all policies would be honoured 
(English, April 2011).   
 
The $500m back-up offer was not redeemed by AMI and a year later they 
finalised the market solution which they had been seeking; with the sale of 
AMI to Australian insurance company IAG.  The $380m sale came with a 
provision that all Canterbury earthquake related claims were to remain the 
responsibility of the Crown.  Once the proceeds of the sale were used to 
cover part of the earthquake claim shortfall, the Crown estimates its support 
of AMI will cost them $100m. (English, April 2012)   
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4.2 The Earthquake Commission 
(EQC) 
 
The estimated value of claims to EQC following the September quake was 
$3bn.  Despite their books looking sound after this quake, the subsequent 
earthquakes have brought their estimated liability for losses to $12bn. As 
discussed earlier, EQC obtained international reinsurance for events with 
losses above $1.5bn, up to a maximum of $4bn.  In other words, for an event 
which generates claims above $4bn, approximately $2.5bn was covered by 
reinsurance. Accounting for this reinsurance cover, EQC’s direct liability for 
the Canterbury earthquake claims is approximately $7bn, which includes the 
costs of reinsurance excesses in the three largest quakes and the losses 
beyond $4bn which occurred during the February quake. 
 
At the end of the 2010 financial year, the Natural Disaster Fund had a 
balance of approximately $6bn.  There is an obvious shortfall of over $1bn 
between this fund and EQC’s direct liability.  To help meet this shortfall 
Finance Minister Bill English announced a rise in EQC levies for 2012, 
tripling the premium to 15 cents for every $100 of insurance cover, up to a 
maximum of $207 (English, October 2011).  The Government is liable for 
the shortfall, which is expected to halve as a results of these changes to just 
under $500m.   
4.3 Reinsurance Companies 
 
Reinsurance companies were indirectly liable for the majority of the 
Canterbury earthquakes’ $24bn of insured losses.  As large international 
institutions, these companies were facing pressures from a record breaking 
number of natural disasters in 2011.  The Japan earthquake and Thailand 
floods were alongside the Canterbury earthquakes in contributing toward a 
total of $140bn insured losses from natural catastrophes and man-made 
disasters (Swiss Re, 2011). Despite a year of expensive disasters, the 
reinsurance companies escaped in relatively good shape, presumably due to 
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their well-diversified nature.  The average loss as a percentage of annual 
premiums written, as reported by the Reinsurance Association of America, 
was just over 5% (2012).  Considering the substantial capital reserves the 
companies are able to build up in more settled periods, this amount is 
relatively insignificant.  
 
The Canterbury earthquakes, in conjunction with the earthquake in Japan 
(which is also situated on the “Pacific Ring of Fire”), have meant that NZ is 
no longer considered a low risk economy for reinsurers.  To encourage 
reinsurers to invest in the NZ market and to compensate them for the extra 
(perceived) risk they are required to hold following the Canterbury 
earthquake, reinsurers are commanding a higher rate of return- driving up 
reinsurance premiums. 
New Zealand Minister Gerry Brownlee flew to London in late 2011 to talk to 
reinsurers about the Christchurch economy.  He assured them the 
Government was assessing reconstruction zones and building requirements 
closely in order to ensure the resulting losses from any future quakes will be 
minimal (Reactions, August 2011).  This was a brazen move to decrease the 
risk perception of New Zealand reinsurance investments, in an attempt to 
limit price increases.   
 
Access to reinsurance remains available to NZ insurance companies, though, 
despite Mr Brownlee’s efforts, the reinsurance premiums have more than 
doubled since the earthquakes and in many cases a higher retention also 
applies (AM Best Newswire, 2011).  The affect is large increases in costs for 
the insurance companies, which are ultimately passed on to their clients in 
the form of higher premiums.   
4.4 NZ Insurance Policy Holders 
 
It is the NZ insurance policy holders that will be paying for the losses in 
Christchurch in the long run.  The local insurance companies do not have the 
ability or incentive to absorb the recent hikes in reinsurance costs, meaning 
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they pass them on to their policy holders.  Likewise, the individual policy 
holders are the ones who end up paying for the rise in the EQC levy, which 
equates to an increase of up to $169 annually.  These drivers are behind the 
increases in insurance premiums for households, the average of which has 
been estimated at as high as 30% (Dickinson, 2012).  Particularly affected 
areas are Christchurch and Wellington, where natural disaster premiums have 
been increased most substantially. 
These policy holders, along with the NZ public as a whole, are also paying 
for the financial contributions made by the Government using tax-payers’ 
money.  The anticipated $500m support of EQC, and the $100m cost of 
handling the claims of AMI’s customers are significant transactions in the 
Government’s book.  The Government are also victim to the rising insurance 
costs, which exceeded their budget forecasts by hundreds of millions of 
dollars in the financial year following the quakes.   
 
Further, the Government have pledged large capital investment for the 
rebuilding of Christchurch city.  In the 2012 Government Budget, they made 
$5.5bn in provisions for the rebuild effort, including planning, management 
and implementation of the build (Booker, 2012).  Christchurch Mayor Bob 
Parker has also indicated he expects further contributions for assistance in the 
development of the City Council’s infrastructure and project development.  
Add to this the accumulating costs of ‘minor’ aftershocks and the 
Government’s books are firmly in the red with regard to Christchurch.  The 
cost of this lies with the public.   
5 Regulatory Change 
 
The Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010 received assent on the 7th 
of September 2010, coincidentally three days after the first of the Canterbury 
earthquakes.  The Act requires the Reserve Bank to promote maintenance of 
a sound and efficient insurance sector, and promote public confidence in the 
sector (Dean, 2010).  RBNZ takes a relatively light-handed approach to the 
implementation of the Act, balancing their three ‘pillars’ of Self Discipline, 
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Market Discipline and Regulatory Discipline.  This method emphasises the 
small weighting RBNZ puts on regulation as a risk management tool; it 
appears to be a safety net which should have little effect on a firm exercising 
prudential management.    
Further, in November 2011, the Reserve Bank created the Prudential 
Supervision Department.  This department, among other things, is 
responsible for the “microprudential regulation” and supervision of insurance 
companies (Fiennes & O’Conner-Close, 2012).  This indicates the increasing 
role of the Reserve Bank in exercising their duty as supervisor, and is a sign 
they are keeping a close eye on the NZ markets.  This move is likely due to 
the increasing volatility of the markets through the global financial crisis, as 
well as the added instability caused by the Canterbury earthquakes.  
 
When proposing regulation, it is important to give significant consideration 
to the risk of moral hazard.  The Government’s eagerness to protect 
consumers by guaranteeing their insurance policies, also results in a 
decreased incentive for insurance companies to act prudently.  This risk 
increased substantially with the Government’s underwriting of AMI, which 
was effectively an admission to the market they would offer a bailout if 
necessary.  In a market with no prudential requirements or supervision, it is 
dangerous to suggest firms will be given Government protection during a 
crisis due to the skewed incentives it creates.  However, by implementing 
minimum requirements in the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010, 
RBNZ attempts to minimize the strength of this moral hazard and align 
insurance companies’ incentives with those of their customers.   
 
Also of importance is the Reserve Bank’s implementation of Basel III, which 
is currently scheduled for January 2015 (Vaughan, 2012).  The regulation 
requires banks to hold more liquid assets and more closely match their 
lending and funding terms.  Although the scope of the regulation does not 
directly include insurance companies, it may restrict their access to bank 
capital for financing risky investment.  More careful lending by banks 
requires a more thorough risk assessment of the insurance companies, placing 
a further check on their liquidity and encouraging prudent lending in the 
market as a whole.   
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6 The Current NZ Insurance Industry  
 
It is not possible to say the NZ insurance industry has fully recovered from 
the Canterbury earthquakes, only that the market has stabilised.  Thousands 
of claims are still being processed by both private insurance companies and 
EQC, and the overall cost of the quakes is still unconfirmed. 
 
EQC have received over 450,000 claims to date, and have paid out over $3bn 
(EQC, 2012).  The increases in levies is expected to help breach the shortfall 
in cash once all claims are processed and the Government anticipates they 
will need to contribute about $500m.  The existence of EQC has certainly 
cushioned the financial impact of the earthquakes on the Government’s 
books, and on the New Zealand economy as a whole. An immediate concern 
is the depletion of the Natural Disaster Fund, which leaves the nation 
exposed to substantial losses in the event of subsequent earthquakes or other 
natural disasters.   
Since their purchase of AMI, IAG now control approximately 60% of New 
Zealand’s home and contents, and car insurance markets.  The sale was 
approved by the Overseas Investment Office, the Commerce Commission 
and the Reserve Bank, though there was public outcry surrounding the loss of 
competition in the market (Tarrant, 2012).  It is difficult to suggest decreased 
competition has driven any part of the recent premium increases, though the 
inherent risks in the NZ insurance industry mean it will certainly be a market 
under close scrutiny moving into the future.  
Such scrutiny will be encouraged by the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) 
Act, which gives governing bodies greater transparency into the insurance 
industry as a whole.  Despite the NZ insurance industry remaining one of the 
most gently regulated internationally, this Act carefully balances the stability 
of the market as a whole with the freedom of individual firms.  This should 
help the NZ market maintain a level of stability in the future, and make 
anticipation of market turbulence a lot easier.  
 
Insurance holders around the country are faced with conflicting effects of the 
earthquake.  The visible destruction of so many homes provides individuals 
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with a constant reminder of the need for insurance, though the increasing 
costs act as a deterrent.  It is not difficult to imagine insurance companies 
releasing a greater variety of policies for natural disasters.  These may 
include capped or conditional payoffs in order to make at least some degree 
of coverage affordable to struggling households.   
7 Conclusion 
 
The Canterbury earthquake has challenged the entire insurance sector in New 
Zealand.  The scale of the loss was unprecedented, and strained our existing 
industry.  Some insurance companies, like AMI, learnt harsh lessons about 
covering their risk and maintaining a diversified portfolio.  Meanwhile, EQC 
proved to be a vital resource for the country, and it has certainly solidified its 
place in the future of the NZ market.  In practically every avenue, New 
Zealand policy holders are the ones who will be paying for the losses in the 
long term.  
The industry has been refined.  Virtually all of the major insurance providers 
in NZ now have Australian parent companies, providing a strong link 
between our markets, the significance of which should not be underestimated.  
RBNZ’s role in exercising prudential supervision is a step forward in 
encouraging stability in the markets, and offers a level of transparency 
valuable for the planning of future events.   
It is difficult to say whether New Zealand’s insurance industry is better 
prepared for a natural disaster now compared to two years ago.  The 
depletion of capital stocks from the natural disaster fund and local insurance 
firms’ balance sheets represents a serious concern.  However, the natural 
disaster reinsurance cover by local insurance companies is no doubt 
strengthened, and the linking of the firms to their Australian parents adds 
further robustness.  The RBNZ can also play a more significant role in 
ensuring these firms are acting prudently.  As for policy holders, the 
increases in premiums are already stretching budgets and any further 
increases may simply be unaffordable.  
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